Distributed model training is vulnerable to byzantine system failures and adversarial compute nodes, i.e., nodes that use malicious updates to corrupt the global model stored at a parameter server (PS). To guarantee some form of robustness, recent work suggests using variants of the geometric median as an aggregation rule, in place of gradient averaging. Unfortunately, median-based rules can incur a prohibitive computational overhead in large-scale settings, and their convergence guarantees often require strong assumptions. In this work, we present DRACO, a scalable framework for robust distributed training that uses ideas from coding theory. In DRACO, each compute node evaluates redundant gradients that are used by the parameter server to eliminate the effects of adversarial updates. DRACO comes with problemindependent robustness guarantees, and the model that it trains is identical to the one trained in the adversary-free setup. We provide extensive experiments on real datasets and distributed setups across a variety of large-scale models, where we show that DRACO is several times, to orders of magnitude faster than median-based approaches.
Introduction
Distributed and parallel implementations of stochastic optimization algorithms have become the de facto standard in large-scale model training [ CSX17 ] studies this problem under a synchronous training setup, where compute nodes evaluate gradient updates and ship them to a parameter server (PS) which stores and updates the global model. Many of the aforementioned work use median-based aggregation, including the geometric median (GM) instead of averaging in order to make their computations more robust. The advantage of median-based approaches is that they can be robust to up to a constant fraction of the compute nodes being adversarial [CSX17] . However, in large data settings, the cost of computing the geometric median can dwarf the cost of computing a batch of gradients [CSX17] , rendering it impractical. Furthermore, proofs of convergence for such systems require restrictive assumptions such as convexity, and need to be re-tailored to each different training algorithm. A scalable distributed training framework that is robust against adversaries and can be applied to a large family of training algorithms (e.g., mini-batch SGD, GD, coordinate descent, SVRG, etc.) remains an open problem.
In this paper, we instead use ideas from coding theory to ensure robustness during distributed training. We present DRACO, a general distributed training framework that is robust against adversarial nodes and worst-case compute errors. We show that DRACO can resist any s adversarial compute nodes during training and returns a model identical to the one trained in the adversary-free setup. This allows DRACO to come with "black-box" convergence guarantees, i.e., proofs of convergence in the adversary-free setup carry through The high level idea behind DRACO's algorithmic redundancy. Suppose we have 4 data points x 1 , . . . , x 4 , and let g i be the gradient of the model with respect to data point x i . Instead of having each compute node i evaluate a single gradient g i , DRACO assigns each node redundant gradients. In this example, the replication ratio is 3, and the parameter server can recover the sum of the gradients from any 2 of the encoded gradient updates. Thus, the PS can still recover the sum of gradients in the presence of an adversary. This can be done through a majority vote on all 6 pairs of encoded gradient updates. This intuitive idea does not scale to a large number of compute nodes. DRACO implements a more systematic and efficient encoding and decoding mechanism that scales to any number of machines.
to the adversarial setup with no modification, unlike prior median-based approaches [BGS + 17, CSX17]. Moreover, in median-based approaches such as [BGS + 17, CSX17], the median computation may dominate the overall training time. In DRACO, most of the computational effort is carried through by the compute nodes. This key factor allows our framework to offer up to orders of magnitude faster convergence in real distributed setups.
To design DRACO, we borrow ideas from coding theory and algorithmic redundancy. In standard adversary-free distributed computation setups, during each distributed round, each of the P compute nodes processes B/P gradients and ships their sum to the parameter server. In DRACO, each compute node processes rB/P gradients and sends a linear combination of those to the PS. Thus, DRACO incurs a computational redundancy ratio of r. While this may seem sub-optimal, we show that under a worst-case adversarial setup, it is information-theoretically impossible to design a system that obtains identical models to the adversary-free setup with less redundancy. Upon receiving the P gradient sums, the PS uses a "decoding" function to remove the effect of the adversarial nodes and reconstruct the original desired sum of the B gradients. With redundancy ratio r, we show that DRACO can tolerate up to (r − 1)/2 adversaries, which is information-theoretically tight. See Fig. 1 for a toy example of DRACO's functionality.
We present two encoding and decoding techniques for DRACO. The encoding schemes are based on the fractional repetition code and cyclic repetition code presented in [TLDK17, RTTD17] . In contrast to previous work on stragglers and gradient codes [TLDK17, RTTD17, CPE17], our decoders are tailored to the adversarial setting and use different methods. Our decoding schemes utilize an efficient majority vote decoder and a novel Fourier decoding technique.
Compared to median-based techniques that can tolerate approximately a constant fraction of "average case" adversaries, DRACO's (r − 1)/2 bound on the number of "worst-case" adversaries may be significantly smaller. However, in realistic regimes where only a constant number of nodes are malicious, DRACO is significantly faster as we show in experiments in Section 4.
We implement DRACO in PyTorch and deploy it on distributed setups on Amazon EC2, where we compare against median-based training algorithms on several real world datasets and various ML models. We show that DRACO is up to orders of magnitude faster compared to GM-based approaches across a range of neural networks, e.g., LeNet, VGG-19, AlexNet, ResNet-18, and ResNet-152, and always converges to the correct adversary-free model, while in some cases median-based approaches do not converge.
Preliminaries
Notation In the following, we denote matrices and vectors in bold, and scalars and functions in standard script. We let 1 m denote the m × 1 all ones vector, while 1 n×m denotes the all ones n × m matrix. We define 0 m , 0 n×m analogously. Given a matrix A ∈ R n×m , we let A i,j denote its entry at location (i, j), A i,· ∈ R 1×m denote its ith row, and A ·,j ∈ R n×1 denote its jth column. Given S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, T ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, we let A S,T denote the submatrix of A where we keep rows indexed by S and columns indexed by T . Given matrices A, B ∈ R n×m , their Hadamard product, denoted A B, is defined as the n × m matrix where
Distributed Training
The process of training a model from data can be cast as an optimization problem known as empirical risk minimization (ERM):
where x i ∈ R m represents the ith data point, n is the total number of data points, w ∈ R d is a model, and (·; ·) is a loss function that measures the accuracy of the predictions made by the model on each data point.
One way to approximately solve the above ERM is through stochastic gradient descent (SGD), which operates as follows. We initialize the model at an initial point w 0 and then iteratively update it according to
where i k is a random data-point index sampled from {1, . . . , n}, and γ > 0 is the learning rate.
In order to take advantage of distributed systems and parallelism, we often use mini-batch SGD. At each iteration of mini-batch SGD, we select a random subset S k ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of the data and update our model according to
Many distributed versions of mini-batch SGD partition the gradient computations across the compute nodes. After computing and summing up their assigned gradients, each nodes sends their respective sum back to the PS. The PS aggregates these sums to update the model w k−1 according to the rule above.
In this work, we consider the question of how to perform this update method in a distributed and robust manner. Fix a batch (or set of points) S k , which after relabeling we assume equals {1, . . . , B}. We will denote ∇ (w k−1 ; x i ) by g i . The fundamental question we consider in this work is how to compute B i=1 g i in a distributed and adversary-resistant manner. We present DRACO, a framework that can compute this summation in a distributed manner, even under the presence of adversaries.
Remark 1. In contrast to previous works, our analysis and framework are applicable to any distributed algorithm which requires the sum of multiple functions. Notably, our framework can be applied to any first-order methods, including gradient descent, SVRG [JZ13] , coordinate descent, and projected or accelerated versions of these algorithms. For the sake of simplicity, our discussion in the rest of the text will focus on mini-batch SGD.
Adversarial Compute Node Model
We consider the setting where a subset of size s of the P compute nodes act adversarially against the training process. The goal of an adversary can either be to completely mislead the end model, or bias it towards specific areas of the parameter space. A compute node is considered to be an adversarial node, if it does not return the prescribed gradient update given its allocated samples. Such a node can ship back to the PS any arbitrary update of dimension equal to that of the true gradient. Mini-batch SGD fails to converge even if there is only a single adversarial node [BGS + 17]. In this work, we consider the strongest possible adversaries. We assume that each adversarial node has access to infinite computational power, the entire data set, the training algorithm, and has knowledge of any defenses present in the system. Furthermore, all adversarial nodes may collaborate with each other.
DRACO: Robust Distributed Training via Algorithmic Redundancy
In this section we present our main results for DRACO. The proofs are left to the appendix.
We generalize the scheme in Figure 1 to P compute nodes and B data samples. At each iteration of our training process, we assign the B gradients to the P compute nodes using a P × B allocation matrix A. Here, A j,k is 1 if node j is assigned the kth gradient g k , and 0 otherwise. The support of A j,· , denoted supp (A j,· ), is the set of indices k of gradients evaluated by the jth compute node. For simplicity, we will assume B = P throughout the following.
DRACO utilizes redundant computations, so it is worth formally defining the amount of redundancy incurred. This is captured by the following definition. In other words, the redundancy ratio is the average number of gradients assigned to each compute node.
Thus, G has all assigned gradients as its columns. The jth compute node first computes a d × P gradient matrix Y j (1 d A j,· ) G using its allocated gradients.
In particular, if the kth gradient g k is allocated to the jth compute node, i.e., A j,k = 0, then the compute node computes g k as the kth column of Y j . Otherwise, it sets the k-th column of Y j to be 0 d .
The jth compute node is equipped with an encoding function E j that maps the d × P matrix Y j of its assigned gradients to a single d-dimensional vector. After computing its assigned gradients, the jth compute node sends z j E j (Y j ) to the PS. If the jth node is adversarial then it instead sends z j + n j to the PS, where n j is an arbitrary d-dimensional vector. We let E be the set of local encoding functions, i.e.,
. Note that at most s columns of N are non-zero. Under this notation, after all updates are finished the PS receives a d × P matrix R Z A,E,G + N. The PS then computes a d-dimensional update gradient vector u D(R) using a decoder function D.
The system in DRACO is determined by the tuple (A, E, D). We decide how to assign gradients by designing A, how each compute node should locally amalgamate its gradients by designing E, and how the PS should decode the output by designing D. The process of DRACO is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Model Update . . . Figure 2: In DRACO, each compute node is allocated a subset of the data set. Each compute node computes redundant gradients, encodes them via E i , and sends the resulting vector to the PS. These received vectors then pass through a decoder that detects where the adversaries are and removes their effects from the updates. The output of the decoder is the true sum of the gradients. The PS applies the updates to the parameter model and we then continue to the next iteration.
This framework of (A, E, D) encompasses both distributed SGD and the GM approach. In distributed mini-batch SGD, we assign 1 gradient to each compute node. After relabeling, we can assume that we assign g i to compute node i. Therefore, A is simply the identity matrix I P . The matrix Y j therefore contains g j in column j and 0 in all other columns. The local encoding function E j simply returns g j by computing E j (Y j ) = Y j 1 P = g j , which it then sends to the PS. The decoding function now depends on the algorithm. For vanilla mini-batch SGD, the PS takes the average of the gradients, while in the GM approach, it takes a geometric median of the gradients.
In order to guarantee convergence, we want DRACO to exactly recover the true sum of gradients, regardless of the behavior of the adversarial nodes. In other words, we want DRACO to protect against worst-case adversaries. Formally, we want the PS to always obtain the d-dimensional vector G1 P via DRACO with any s adversarial nodes. Below is the formal definition.
Definition 2. DRACO with (A, E, D) can tolerate s adversarial nodes, if for any
Remark 2. If we can successfully defend against s adversaries, then the model update after each iteration is identical to that in the adversary-free setup. This implies that any guarantees of convergence in the adversary-free case transfer to the adversarial case.
Redundancy Bound
We first study how much redundancy is required if we want to exactly recover the correct sum of gradients per iteration in the presence of s adversaries.
Theorem 1. Suppose a selection of gradient allocation, encoding, and decoding mechanisms (A, E, D) can tolerate s adversarial nodes. Then its redundancy ratio r must satisfy r ≥ 2s + 1.
The above result is information-theoretic, meaning that regardless of how the compute node encodes and how the PS decodes, each data sample has to be replicated at least 2s + 1 times to defend against s adversarial nodes. Optimal Coding Schemes A natural question is, can we achieve the optimal redundancy bound with linear-time encoding and decoding? More formally, can we design a tuple (A, E, D) that has redundancy ratio r = 2s + 1 and computation complexity O((2s + 1)d) at the compute node and O(P d) at the PS? We give a positive answer by presenting two coding approaches that match the above bounds. The encoding methods are based on the fractional repetition code and the cyclic repetition codes in [TLDK17, RTTD17] .
Fractional Repetition Code Suppose 2s + 1 divides P . The fractional repetition code (derived from [TLDK17] ) works as follows. We first partition the compute nodes into r = 2s + 1 groups. We assign the nodes in a group to compute the same sum of gradients. Letĝ be the desired sum of gradients per iteration. In order to decode the outputs returned by the compute nodes in the same group, the PS uses majority vote to select one value. This guarantees that as long as fewer than half of the nodes in a group are adversarial, the majority procedure will return the correctĝ. Formally, the repetition code
is defined as follows. The assignment matrix A Rep is given by ) to the PS. The decoder works by first finding the majority vote of the output of each compute node that was assigned the same gradients. For instance, since the first r compute nodes were assigned the same gradients, it finds the majority vote of [z 1 , . . . , z r ]. It does the same with each of the blocks of size r, and then takes the sum of the P/r majority votes. We note that our decoder here is different compared to the one used in the straggler mitigation setup of [TLDK17] . Our decoder follows the concept of majority decoding similarly to [VN56, Pip88] .
, where Maj (·) denotes the majority vote function and R is the d × P matrix received from all compute nodes. While a naive implementation of majority vote scales quadratically with the number of compute nodes P , we instead use a streaming version of majority vote [BM91] , the complexity of which is linear in P .
Theorem 2. Suppose 2s + 1 divides P . Then the repetition code (A Rep , E Rep , D Rep ) with r = 2s + 1 can tolerate any s adversaries, achieves the optimal redundancy ratio, and has linear-time encoding and decoding.
Cyclic Code Next we describe a cyclic code whose encoding method comes from [TLDK17] and is similar to that of [RTTD17] . We denote the cyclic code, with encoding and decoding functions, by (A Cyc , E Cyc , D Cyc ). The cyclic code provides an alternative way to tolerate adversaries in distributed setups. We will show that the cyclic code also achieves the optimal redundancy ratio and has linear-time encoding and decoding. Another difference compared to the repetition code is that in the cyclic code, the compute nodes will compute and transmit complex vectors, and the decoding function will take as input these complex vectors.
To better understand the cyclic code, imagine that all P gradients we wish to compute are arranged in a circle. Since there are P starting positions, there are P possible ways to pick a sequence consisting of 2s + 1 clock-wise consecutive gradients in the circle. Assigning each sequence of gradients to each compute node leads to redundancy ratio r = 2s + 1. The allocation matrix for the cyclic code is A Cyc , where the i row contains r = 2s + 1 consecutive ones, between position (i − 1)r + 1 to i · r modulo B.
In the cyclic code, each compute node computes a linear combination of its assigned gradients. This can be viewed as a generalization of the repetition code's encoder. Formally, we construct some P × P matrix
G denote the gradients computed at compute node j. The local encoding function E In order to decode, the PS needs to detect which compute nodes are adversarial and recover the correct gradient summation from the non-adversarial nodes. Methods to do the latter alone in the presence of straggler nodes was presented in [TLDK17] and [RTTD17] . Suppose there is a function φ(·) that can compute the adversarial node index set V . We will later construct φ explicitly. Let U be the index set of the nonadversarial nodes. Suppose that the span of W ·,U contains 1 P . Thus, we can obtain a vector b by solving W ·,U b = 1 P . Finally, since U is the index set of non-adversarial nodes, for any j ∈ U , we must have n j = 0. Thus, we can use
The decoder function is given formally in Algorithm 1.
To make this approach work, we need to design a matrix W and the index location function φ(·) such that (i) For all j, k, A j,k = 0 =⇒ W j,k = 0 and the span of W ·,U contains 1 P , and (ii) φ(·) can locate the adversarial nodes.
Let us first construct W. Let C be a P × P inverse discrete Fourier transformation (IDFT) matrix, i.e.,
Let C L be the first P − 2s rows of C and C R be the last 2s rows. Let α j be the set of row indices of the zero entries in A Cyc ·,j , i.e., α j = {k : A Cyc j,k = 0}. Note that C L is a (P − 2s) × P Vandermonde matrix and thus any P − 2s columns of it are linearly independent. Since |α j | = P − 2s − 1, we can obtain a P − 2s − 1-dimensional vector q j uniquely by solving 0 = q j 1 · [C L ] ·,αj . Construct a P × (P − 2s − 1) matrix Q q 1 q 2 · · · q P and a P × P matrix W Q 1 P · C L . One can verify that (i) each row of W has the same support as the allocation matrix A Cyc and (ii) the span of any P − 2s + 1 columns of W contains 1 P , summarized as follows.
Lemma 3. For all j, k, A j,k = 0 ⇒ W j,k = 0. For any index set U such that |U | ≥ P − (2s + 1), the column span of W ·,U contains 1 P .
The φ(·) function works as follows. Given the d × P matrix R Cyc received from the compute nodes, we
T by solving
. . .
We then compute h = Lemma 4. Suppose N = [n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n P ] satisfies |{j : n j 0 = 0}| ≤ s. Then φ(R Cyc ) = φ(GW + N) = {j : n j 0 = 0} with probability 1.
Finally we can show that the cyclic code can tolerate any s adversaries and also achieves redundancy ratio and has linear-time encoding and decoding.
Theorem 5. The cyclic code (A Cyc , E Cyc , D Cyc ) can tolerate any s adversaries with probability 1 and achieves the redundancy ratio lower bound. For d P , its encoding and decoding achieve linear-time computational complexity.
Note that the cyclic code requires transmitting complex vectors GW which potentially doubles the bandwidth requirement. To handle this problem, one can transform the original real gradient G ∈ R d×P into a complex gradientĜ ∈ C d/2 ×P by letting its ith component have real part G i and complex part G d/2 +i .
Then the compute nodes only need to sendĜW. Once the PS recoversû Cyc Ĝ 1 P , it can simply sum the real and imaginary parts to form the true gradient summation, i.e., u Cyc = Re(û Cyc ) + Im(û Cyc ) = G1 P .
Experiments
In this section we present an empirical study of DRACO and compare it to the median-based approach in [CSX17] under different adversarial models and real distributed environments. The main findings are as follows: 1) For the same training accuracy, DRACO is up to orders of magnitude faster compared to the GM-based approach; 2) In some instances, the GM approach [CSX17] does not converge, while DRACO converges in all of our experiments, regardless of which dataset, machine learning model, and adversary attack model we use; 3) Although DRACO is faster than GM-based approaches, its runtime can sometimes scale linearly with the number of adversaries due to the algorithmic redundancy needed to defend against adversaries.
Implementation and Setup
We compare vanilla mini-batch SGD to both DRACO-based mini-batch SGD and GM-based mini-batch SGD [CSX17] . In mini-batch SGD, there is no data replication and each compute node only computes gradients sampled from its partition of the data. The PS then averages all received gradients and updates the model. In GM-based mini-batch SGD, the PS uses the geometric median instead of average to update the model. We have implemented all of these in PyTorch [PGC + 17] with MPI4py [DPKC11] deployed on the m4.2/4/10xlarge instances in Amazon EC2 2 . We conduct our experiments on various adversary attack models, datasets, learning problems and neural network models.
Adversarial Attack Models
We consider two adversarial models. First, we consider the "reversed gradient" adversary, where adversarial nodes that were supposed to send g to the PS instead send −cg, for some c > 0. Next, we consider a "constant adversary" attack, where adversarial nodes always send a constant multiple κ of the all-ones vector to the PS with dimension equal to that of the true gradient. In our experiments, we set c = 100 for the reverse gradient adversary, and κ = −100 for the constant adversary. In either setup, at each iteration, s nodes are randomly selected to act as adversaries. 
End-to-end Convergence Performance
We first evaluate the end-to-end convergence performance of DRACO, using both the repetition and cyclic codes, and compare it to ordinary mini-batch SGD as well as the GM approach. The datasets and their associated learning models are summarized in [PL05] . The experiments were run on a cluster of 45 compute nodes instantiated on m4.2xlarge instances. At each iteration, we randomly select s = 1, 3, 5 (2.2%, 6.7%, 11.1% of all compute nodes) nodes as adversaries. All three methods are trained for 10,000 distributed iterations. Figure 3 shows how the testing accuracy varies with training time. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 give a detailed account of the speedups of DRACO compared to the GM approach, where we run both systems until they achieve the same designated testing accuracy. Table 2 : Speedups (i.e., X times faster) of DRACO (Repetition/Cyclic Codes) over GM when using a fullyconnected neural network on the MNIST dataset. We run both methods until they reach the same specified testing accuracy. In the 6.7% rev grad 3.1/2.5 3.3/3.1 5.5/4.8 4.5/3.7
11.1% rev grad 2.7/2.3 3.0/2.6 3.1/2.7 3.1/2.6
First, as expected, ordinary mini-batch may not converge even if there is only one adversary. Second, under the reverse gradient adversary model, DRACO converges several times faster than the GM approach, using both the repetition and cyclic codes. In fact, as shown in the speedup tables, both the repetition and the cyclic code versions of DRACO achieve up to more than an order of magnitude speedup compared to the GM approach. We suspect that this is because the computation of the GM is extremely expensive compared to the encoding and decoding overhead of DRACO. Table 3 : Speedups of DRACO (with both repetition and cyclic codes) over GM when using ResNet-18 on Cifar10. We run both methods until they reach the same specified testing accuracy. Here ∞ means that the GM approach failed to converge to the same accuracy reached by DRACO.
Test Accuracy 80% 85% 88% 90%
2.2% rev grad 2.6/2.0 3.3/2. Under the constant adversary model, the GM approach sometimes failed to converge while DRACO still converged in all of our experiments. This reflects our theory, which shows that DRACO always returns a model identical to the model trained by the ordinary algorithm in an adversary-free environment. One reason why the GM approach may fail to converge is that by using the geometric median, it is actually losing information about a subset of the gradients. Under the constant adversary model, the PS effectively gains no information about the gradients computed by the adversarial nodes, and cannot recover the desired optimal model. Another reason that GM may not converge may be because theoretical convergence guarantees of GM require certain assumptions on the underlying models, such as convexity. Since neural networks are generally non-convex, we have no guarantees that GM converges in these settings. It is worth noting that GM may also not converge if we were to use an algorithm such as L-BFGS or accelerated gradient descent, as the choice of algorithm is separate from the underlying properties of the neural network models. Nevertheless, DRACO still converges for such algorithms. We use a batch size of B = 180 and split the data among compute nodes. Therefore, each compute node is assigned B n = 4 data points per iteration. We use the Cifar10 dataset for all the aforementioned networks. For networks like AlexNet that were not designed for small images, we resize the Cifar10 images to fit the network. As shown in Figure 4 , with s = 5, the encoding and decoding time of DRACO can be several times larger than the computation time of ordinary SGD, though SGD may not converge in adversarial settings. Nevertheless, DRACO is still several times faster than GM. Table 5 , 6 and 7 provide the detailed cost of the runtime of each component of the algorithm in training ResNet-152, VGG-19 and AlexNet, respectively. While the communication cost is high in both DRACO and the GM method, the decoding time of the GM approach, i.e., its geometric median update at the PS, is prohibitively high. Meanwhile, the encoding and decoding overhead of DRACO is relatively negligible in these cases. 
Effects of number of adversaries
We also analyze how the number of adversaries affects the performance of DRACO. We ran Cifar10 on ResNet-18 with 15 compute nodes, varying the number of adversaries s from 1 to 7. For these experiments, we used the constant adversary model. For the repetition code, we adapted the group size based on s while in the cyclic code we always took 2s + 1. Figure 5 shows the total runtime cost of DRACO does not increase significantly as the number of adversaries increase. This is likely due to the fact that even at s = 7, the communication cost (which is not affected by the number of stragglers) is the dominant cost of the algorithm. 
Conclusion and Open Problems
In this work we presented DRACO, a framework for robust distributed training via algorithmic redundancy. DRACO is robust to arbitrarily malicious compute nodes, while being orders of magnitude faster than state-of-the-art robust distributed systems. We give information-theoretic lower bounds on how much redundancy is required to resist adversaries while maintaining the correct update rule, and show that DRACO achieves this lower bound. There are several interesting future directions.
First, DRACO is designed to output the same model with or without adversaries. However, slightly inexact model updates often do not decrease performance noticeably. Therefore, we might ask whether we can either (1) tolerate more stragglers or (2) reduce the computational cost of DRACO by only approximately recovering the desired gradient summation. Second, while we give two relatively efficient methods for encoding and decoding, there may be others that are more efficient for use in distributed setups.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For simplicity of proof, let us define a valid s-attack first.
Definition 3. N = [n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n P ] is a valid s attack if and only if |{j : n j 0 = 0}| ≤ s. Now we prove theorem 1. Suppose (A, E, D) can resist s adversaries. The goal is to prove A 0 ≥ P (2s + 1). In fact we can prove a slightly stronger version: A ·,i 0 ≥ (2s + 1) , i = 1, 2, · · · , B. Suppose for some i, A ·,i 0 = τ < (2s + 1). Without loss of generality, assume that A 1,i , A 2,i , A τ,i are non-zero. Let
Since (A, E, D) can protect against s adversaries, we have for any G,
for any valid s-attack N. In particular, let g
Our goal is to find
) which then will lead to a contradiction. Construct and thus
This gives us a contradiction. Hence, the assumption is not correct and we must have A ·,i 0 ≥ (2s + 1) , i = 1, 2, · · · , P . Thus, we must have A 0 ≥ (2s + 1)P . A direct but interesting corollary of this theorem is a bound on the number of adversaries DRACO can resist.
Corollary 6. (A, E, D) can resist at most P −1 2 adversarial nodes. Proof. According to Theorem 1, the redundancy ratio is at least 2s + 1, meaning that every data point must be replicated by at least 2s + 1. Since there are P compute node in total, we must have 2s + 1 ≤ P , which implies s ≤ P −1 2 . Thus, (A, E, D) can resist at most
In other words, at least a majority of the compute nodes must be non-adversarial.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Since there are at most s adversaries, there are at least 2s + 1 − s = s + 1 non-adversarial compute nodes in each group. Thus, performing majority vote on each group returns the correct gradient, and thus the repetition code guarantees that the result is correct. The complexity at each compute node is clearly O((2s + 1)d) since each of them only computes the sum of (2s + 1) d-dimensional gradients. For the decoder at the PS, within each group of (2s + 1) machine, it takes O((2s + 1)d) computations to find the majority. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove that
Next we prove that for any index set U such that |U | ≥ P − (2s + 1), the column span of W ·,U contains 1. This is equivalent to that for any index set U such that |U | ≥ P − (2s + 1), there exists a vector b such that W ·,U b = 1. Now we show such b exists. Note that C L is a (P − 2s) × P full rank Vandermonde matrix and thus any P − 2s columns of C L are linearly independent. LetŪ be the first P − 2s elements in U . Then all columns of [C L ] ·,Ū are linearly independent and thus
For any j ∈Ū , let b j = 0. Then we have
This completes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
We need a few lemmas first.
Then we have Pr({j : γ j = 0} = {j : N ·,j 0 = 0}) = 1.
Proof. Let us prove that
Pr(N ·,j = 0}|γ j = 0) = 1.
and Pr(γ j = 0|N ·,j = 0}) = 1.
for any j. Combining those two equations we prove the lemma. The first equation is straightforward. Suppose N ·,j = 0. Then we immediately have γ j = fN ·,j = 0. For the second one, note that f has entries drawn independently from the standard normal distribution. Therefore we have that
2 ). Since γ j is a random variable with normal distribution, the probability of it being any particular value is 0. In particular,
and thus
Pr(γ j = 0|N ·,j = 0}) = 1 which proves the second equation and finishes the proof.
Lemma 8. R
In the last equation we use the fact that IDFT matrix is unitary and thus C L C † R = 0 (P −2s)×(2s) .
Lemma 9. Let a
T be the discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) of a
T which has at most s non-zero elements, i.e.,ĥ = C †t and t 0 ≤ s. Then
Furthermore, for anyβ satisfying the above equations,
always holds for all , whereĥ =ĥ P + .
Proof. Let i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i s be the index of the non-zero elements int. Let us define the location polynomial
Now we prove thatβ =β * is a solution to the system of linear equations (A.1). To see this, note that by definition, for any λ, we have 0 = p(e
Summing over λ, we have
By definition,ĥ j = C j,·t = 1 Now let us prove for anyβ that satisfies equation (A.1), we have (A.2). Note that an equivalent form of (A.2) is that the following system of linear equations
holds for = 0, 1, 2 · · · , P − 1. We prove this by induction. When = 1, this is true sinceβ satisfies the system of linear equations in (A.1). Assume it holds for = µ, i.e.,
Now we need to prove it also holds when = µ + 1, i.e.,
First, since bothβ,β * satisfy the induction assumption, we must have
Due to the induction assumption, one can verify that
and thus we have
Hence, ĥ P −s+µĥP −s−1+µ . . .ĥ P −1+µ β = ĥ P −s+µĥP −s−1+µ . . .ĥ P −1+µ β * + ĥ P −s+µĥP −s−1+µ . . .ĥ P −1+µ (β −β * ) =ĥ P +µ =ĥ P −1+µ+1 .
Furthermore, by induction assumption, we have
Combing those two result we have proved
By induction, the equation A.3 holds for all = 0, 1, · · · , P − 1. Equation A.3 immediately finishes the proof.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 4. By Lemma 7, for the P -dimensional vector γ = (fN) T , we have Pr({j : γ j = 0} = {j : N ·,j 0 = 0}) = 1,
Since there are at most s adversaries, the number of non-zero columns in N is at most s and hence there are at most s non-zero elements in γ, i.e., γ 0 ≤ s, with probability 1. Now consider the case when γ 0 ≤ s. First note that [h P −2s , h P −2s+1 , · · · , h P −1 ] = fR Cyc C † R = fNC † R = γ T C † R , where the second equation is due to Lemma 8. Now let us constructĥ = [ĥ 0 ,ĥ 1 , · · · ,ĥ P −1 ]
T byĥ = C † γ. Note that C is symmetric and thus
One can easily verify thatĥ = h , = P − 2s, P − 2s + 1, · · · , P − 1. Therefore, the equation where the second equation is because of the induction assumption for ≤ µ,ĥ = h . Thus, we have h =ĥ for all , which means h =ĥ = C † γ. Thus t, the IDFT of h, becomes t = Ch = CC † γ = γ. Then the returned Index Set V = {j : e j+1 = 0} = {j : γ j = 0}. By Lemma 7, with probability 1, {j : γ j = 0} = {j : n j 0 = 0}. Therefore, we have with probability 1, V = {j : n j 0 = 0}, which finishes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
We first prove the correctness of the cyclic code. By Lemma 4, the set U contains the index of all nonadversarial compute nodes with probability 1. By Lemma 3, there exists b such that W ·,U b = 1. Therefore, u Cyc = R Cyc ·,U b = (GW + N) ·,U b = GW ·,U b = G1 P . Thus, The cyclic code (A Cyc , E Cyc , D Cyc ) can recover the desired gradient and hence resist any ≤ s adversaries with probability 1.
Next we show the efficiency of the cyclic code. By the construction of A Cyc and W, the redundancy ratio is 2s + 1 which reaches the lower bound. Each compute node needs to compute a linear combination of the gradients of the data it holds, which needs O ((2s + 1)d) computations. For the PS, the detection function φ(·) takes O(d) (generating the random vector f) + O(dP + 2P s) (computing fRC † R ) + O(s 2 ) (solving the Toeplitz system of linear equations in (A.1) ) + O((P − 2s)s) (computing h , = 0, 1, 2, · · · , P − 2s − 1 ) + O(P log P ) (computing the DFT of h ) + O(P ) (examining the non-zero elements of t ) = O(d + dP + 2P s + s 2 + (P − 2s)s + P log P + P ) = O(dP + P s + P log P ). Finding the vector b takes O(P 3 ) (by simply constructing b via [C L ] ·,Ū , though better algorithms may exist). The recovering equation R ·,U b takes O(dP ). Thus, in total, the decoder at the PS takes O(dP + P 3 + P log P ). When d P , i.e., d = Ω(P 2 ), this becomes O(dP ). Therefore, (A Cyc , E Cyc , D Cyc ) also achieves linear-time encoding and decoding.
B Streaming Majority Vote Algorithm
In this section we present the Boyer-Moore majority vote algorithm [BM91] , which is an algorithm that only needs computation linear in the size of the sequence. Clearly this algorithm runs in linear time and it is known that if there is a majority item then the algorithm finally will return it [BM91] .
